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Like the electric, water, and information networks most of modern society relies
on, there is another network, one far less visible, that makes modern life possible:
the global supply chain. Almost every physical product that is grown, manufac-
tured, or packaged arrives at a store or at our home through a series of transfers
involving ships, planes, trains, and trucks. In between, products may be aggregat-
ed into pallets and containers; moved with cranes or forklifts; stored in ports,
warehouses, or on shelves; kept secure in armored vehicles or vaults; kept fresh in
refrigerated storage or “reefer” transportation units; and packaged, repackaged, or
finished before they get into our hands. Supply-chain management, which involves
everything from the sourcing and procurement of materials to logistics, is a major
part of the U.S. economy. In 2011, U.S. business logistics costs totaled $1.28 trillion
and accounted for 8.5 percent of the GDP.1
I am one of the developers of a new suite of technologies and standards for the
supply chain that is based on low-cost, ubiquitous radio frequency identification
(RFID). Our system, which is called the Electronic Product Code (EPC), consists
of protocols for communication between readers and tags, and standards for stor-
ing and sharing data across companies. The project started at MIT in 1998, and by
2003, engineers from more than one hundred companies and faculty and students
from five universities were collaborating to flesh out the system, build prototypes,
and conduct field trials. About 2.5 billion EPC tags will be produced and deployed
worldwide in 2012, and companies including Walmart, Airbus, JCPenney, and
Inditex are in the midst of rollouts. 
© 2012 Sanjay Sarma
innovations / volume 7, number 3 35
Sanjay Sarma 
How Inexpensive RFID Is 
Revolutionizing the Supply Chain
Innovations Case Narrative: 
The Electronic Product Code
Sanjay Sarma is a Professor in the Mechanical Engineering Department at MIT. He
is the cofounder of the Auto-ID Center at MIT, which developed many of the techni-
cal concepts and standards prevalent in the RFID industry today. He currently serves
on the board of governors for EPCglobal and is a board member of OATSystems, a
software company he helped found.
36 innovations / Making in America
THE SUPPLY CHAIN
Supply chains such as the caravans traveling the ancient Silk Road have spanned
international borders for centuries. What has changed in recent history is the
extent to which we depend on the global supply chain for everyday products such
as toothpaste and clothes. This has been made possible by relatively low shipping
costs, lower trade barriers, and the availability of low-cost labor in various parts of
the world. The computation and sensors needed to manage modern logistics have
barely managed to keep up with the increasing complexity of supply chains. Every
day, billions of product barcodes are scanned, and trillions of pieces of information
are keyed into computers manually to keep track of physical inventories.2
Hundreds of thousands of scanners, cameras, optical character recognition sys-
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A Primer on RFID
RFID systems consist of readers and tags. The reader puts out an RF signal and
“illuminates” the tag, which consists of a chip and an antenna. A passive RFID
tag doesn’t have batteries; it absorbs some of the energy coming in from the RF
signal to power up its chip and then reflects a signal back to the reader, in which
its identity and other information are encoded. RFID systems can operate at dif-
ferent frequencies. National governments own the frequency spectrum in their
territories and they license frequency bands to private and public customers,
such as television stations, mobile phone companies, and military services. Each
license specifies not just the frequency range but also the power or field strength
the licensee can emit from its devices. Some frequency bands are kept “open” for
general use, and RFID generally operates in these open bands. In 1998, most
passive RFID was in the low-frequency (LF) and high-frequency (HF) bands.
Performance at these bands is limited to a range of a few feet for a reasonably
sized antenna. Ultra-high frequency offered the promise of a higher range, but
the products available in 1998 did not provide the right price-to-performance
ratio to take advantage of them. 
When a reader starts reading tags, the tags must not respond all at once. The
reader needs to space out the tags so it can hear each individually. This is called
anti-collision, and it is a central factor not just in RFID but in all computer net-
working. Once a tag has been identified, the reader talks to each tag. The com-
munication between reader and tags occurs by modulating the amplitude or fre-
quency of the signal at the allocated frequency. The reader looks for these per-
turbations and extracts an encoded stream of bits—ones and zeros—to get data
from the tag. The reader and tag need to have an agreed upon format for storing
data: where the ID starts in the string, where it ends, what other data the tag may
want to convey, etc. Together, the anti-collision scheme, the modulation scheme,
the encoding scheme, and the data format are referred to as the protocol for
communication between readers and tags.
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tems, label printers, weighing machines, and GPS systems hum away, trying to
tame the chaos of the movement of goods across the planet. Along the way, parts
are ordered and delivered, purchases are made and money exchanged, regulations
are met and customs duties are paid, and products are inspected for authenticity,
quality, and regulatory compliance. This massive system is the engine of the mod-
ern economy.
Such a complex system cannot be flawless, and the range of possible errors is
extensive. Every time products are packaged into cartons, there is the possibility
that one less box, one more box, or the wrong box enters the expected mix. These
possibilities are compounded exponentially if we consider all the physical aggrega-
tion, disaggregation, picking, sorting, and transfers that occur along the supply
chain: building pallets, placing them in trucks, unloading the trucks at ports, plac-
ing goods in containers, loading the containers onto ships, unloading them at
other ports, unloading containers, moving goods into warehouses, and so on.
Meanwhile, there are limited ways to verify the correctness of a transfer. If a fork-
lift operator can be persuaded to dismount, pick up a scanner, and find the label
on a pallet, there is a chance he might discover that the wrong pallet has been
placed in the truck. More often than not, however, errors go undetected, which
leads to excess inventories or shortages. 
Excess inventory causes headaches in several ways: holding costs increase,
products become obsolete, products degrade, and pilferage increases. Stock-outs—
that is, when there is no stock available to satisfy demand—are even more damag-
ing because they interrupt commerce. In U.S. retail, for example, studies show that
the average product is stocked out on shelves 8 percent of the time, which can lead
to lost sales and dissatisfied consumers. Errors can lead to other problems as well,
such as food spoilage and expired or damaged pharmaceuticals. The natural
response to a fear of stock-outs is to increase inventory, which further compounds
errors in the supply chain. This contributes significantly to the “bull-whip” effect:3
factory orders can fluctuate greatly, leading to a type of boom-bust cycle that
makes business planning difficult. 
The massive integration of the supply chain also magnifies the impact of mis-
takes and illicit activities in production. We all are familiar with the periodic recall
of food contaminated with salmonella, e-coli, or chemicals, which are examples of
the global supply chain being a victim of its own success. Because goods can be
transported so far so rapidly, mistakes can spread rapidly too. In 2011, for exam-
ple, there were more than two hundred food recalls in the U.S. FDA registry. Illicit
activities are even more pernicious. Counterfeit or diluted drugs in the global sup-
ply chain are a $50 billion business worldwide, which does not account for the
immeasurable impact this has on human lives. 
There are ad hoc measures for addressing each of these problems, but they
tend to be manual and expensive. What is needed is a silent way to identify and
count goods in the supply chain continuously and everywhere. Imagine a “toll
pass” system that identifies goods in the supply chain, just as the E-ZPass system—
which is an example of RFID—identifies cars at highway toll booths. In 1998,
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RFID technology was several orders of magnitude too expensive for the supply
chain, so we set out to enable low-cost RFID tracking of goods—everything from
frozen food to boxes of toothpaste.
THE FORMATION OF THE AUTO-ID CENTER
I first became excited about RFID because of my colleague Dr. David Brock, a
roboticist at the Lab for Manufacturing and Productivity. David had an elegant
concept in mind: why ask robots to laboriously recognize objects using computer
vision and image processing when we could place a marker on the objects and have
the robot simply read the marker? The marker he had in mind was an RFID tag.
Unlike barcodes, which are read optically, RFID tags can be read without a line of
sight—or, as we used to joke, telepathically. He further proposed putting an ID on
the tag and putting the information needed on the Internet. The ID could then
point to the location of the data, effectively increasing the data capacity of an RFID
tag immeasurably.
I saw the problem from a completely different angle. RFID tags were very
expensive at that time—around several dollars each. My angle was this: if we sim-
plified RFID tags and protocols to the point where they were cost-competitive with
barcodes, perhaps we could make RFID tags ubiquitous in the supply chain. Based
on some back-of-the-envelope calculations, I proposed that the cost of tags could
be brought down to 10 cents. David and I combined forces, and our effort was
underway. 
In early 1999 we met Kevin Ashton, a rising executive at Procter & Gamble
(P&G) who was a brand manager for Oil of Olay and based in London. Kevin had
been struggling with the problem of stock-outs of his products on shelves. He had
done a great deal of business research on RFID and concluded that it would solve
his problem—and a number of other problems in the supply chain as well. When
he heard our pitch, he immediately pledged to introduce us to the senior manage-
ment at P&G and Gillette. 
Kevin also introduced us to Al Haberman, the venerable “father of the UPC
barcode” (for Universal Product Code). Twenty-five years earlier, Al, then the CEO
of a retail company, had lead the formation of the Uniform Code Council (now
GS1 US), which had ushered in the use of the UPC barcode in retail worldwide. By
1999, five billion barcodes were being scanned daily. Al too had the feeling that a
new technology was needed to enable the supply chain to make the next leap. We
pitched more then 30 companies over the next several months, and by September
1999 we had signed up P&G, Gillette, and the Uniform Code Council as sponsors. 
The formation of the Auto-ID Center (for Automatic Identification) was
announced at the 25th anniversary celebration of the barcode, which was held at the
Smithsonian Institute in Washington, D.C. The Auto-ID Center was established as
a research consortium; Richard Cantwell, then a senior executive at Gillette who
would serve as the long-term mentor for the center, became the first chairman of
the sponsor board. We also recruited Sunny Siu, a network researcher at MIT, to
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become the center’s research head because we felt that the load on the network
would be a serious technical obstacle to our vision. As it turned out, the network
was not our most serious obstacle. Sunny left MIT shortly after and I took over his
role as research head of the center, and lured Kevin Ashton to become executive
director. That move paid off. Kevin and I became close collaborators for the next
four years and added over a hundred sponsors to our effort. Picking up on the
Universal Product Code, David christened the unique number in our RFID tags
the Electronic Product Code, and the Auto-ID Center was on its way.
THE JOURNEY
Little did we realize then how difficult the path was that lay ahead. We had taken
on several major challenges: meeting complex technology expectations, attacking
the semiconductor industry, joining the battle between retailers and suppliers, and,
perhaps most importantly, confronting a general resistance to change among logis-
tics professionals. 
A Unifying Vision
In 1999, RFID was a very fragmented space, with several existing protocols at dif-
ferent frequencies. Many of the protocols were proprietary—in other words,
owned by a single company and covered by patents. It took me several months to
realize that the way “standards” worked in RFID often was to combine different,
privately developed protocols into a single document and offer cross-licensing
under terms referred to as RAND—reasonable and nondiscriminatory. The proto-
cols also were commercially fragmented. For example, some RFID systems were
designed for public transport. A city that used a particular proprietary protocol
needed to work with the company it belonged to or with a licensee to install read-
ers at all its turnstiles. This arrangement worked well in closed-loop systems and
guaranteed a relatively healthy annuity to the contracting company. Furthermore,
the cost of a tag in such applications wasn’t critical—people tend to keep their
commuter passes, so a $2 tag was acceptable. There was no incentive to simplify
the protocols and make tags cheaper because there was no great advantage in doing
so. Moreover, the semiconductor manufacturing facilities where high-end, cheap-
er RFID chips could be made were otherwise occupied at that time in the manu-
facture of more lucrative offerings, such as communications chips.
Our vision was entirely different—it was all or nothing. We wanted the EPC
tag placed on a product in China to be readable on a ship in the Pacific, in a port
in California, on a truck in the Midwest, in a warehouse in Illinois, and in the back
room, display shelf, and checkout of a retailer in Chicago. Our system worked
everywhere. For the 10-cent tag to take off, the protocol had to be as free of the
shackles of intellectual property (IP) as possible and have a global reach. If the
market would buy into it, there would be perhaps billions of RFID tags in a few
years. 
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The Minimalist Tag
In order to achieve a read range of a few meters, we decided at the very beginning
to concentrate on UHF RFID tags, which were needed for tracking inventory.  Our
approach to both cost and IP was to start from scratch instead of using existing
protocols. In our early research, Sunny Siu and I had noticed that existing proto-
cols were “heavy,” in the sense of providing unnecessary functionality at the
expense of performance, so we decided our approach would be to develop a min-
imalist, lightweight protocol that did just one thing very rapidly: identifying all the
tags in a large population rapidly and reliably. By keeping the algorithm simple, we
were sure we also would minimize the number of transistors needed to implement
the protocol, and therefore minimize the area of the semiconductor chip. At that
time, chip costs dominated the cost of the tags, and getting the price down to a
couple of cents meant we only could afford a couple thousand transistors per chip.
The argument made sense, and broke the vicious cycle of cost and performance
that RFID had been trapped in, but it was a big bet. The bet was: we will make the
tags lightweight and fast, and bet on the ability to read rapidly. Adoption will fol-
low, driving costs down to commodity levels.
Our simulations were promising, but who would make the chip for us? Our
initial brushes with large chipmakers were discouraging—their reactions ranged
from disbelief to downright hostility. The risks were too great, we realized, and the
rewards too far off to satisfy the ambitions of any up-and-coming executive doing
a cozy business in bus passes. The innovation would have to be made by somebody
else. 
Eventually it was startup companies that came to our rescue. The first was
Alien, a California-based company founded by Dr. Steven Smith, a UC Berkeley
researcher. Jeff Jacobsen, who was CEO of Alien at the time, immediately under-
stood our vision and jumped in with both feet. Startups, after all, have little to lose
and are formed precisely to address the risky challenges that large companies balk
at. Roger Stewart of Alien and Dan Engels, Matt Reynolds, and I from MIT start-
ed to design an aggressive minimalist protocol. Later, Curt Carrender and John
Price of Alien joined the team and advocated a more conservative approach. The
outcome of this process was the Gen 1 Class I EPC protocol. Alien agreed to pro-
duce chips according to this protocol, and we were off and running. 
Later, another startup company, Matrix RFID, joined the mix. Founded inde-
pendently to develop a proprietary protocol that had the same elements of mini-
malism as our design, Matrix had a successful product that many of our sponsor
companies found attractive. Matrix agreed to make their protocol “open” if we
would “bless” it as a standard. This was a big compromise of our mantra of having
a single global protocol, but in the end we did make the compromise, for three rea-
sons: first, we realized it would unify the community; second, the Matrix protocol
was in line with our principles of minimalism; third, we realized that one reader
could read tags from either protocol.
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The RFID reader was another problem we tackled directly. Kevin Ashton and
I were adamant that a single reader should be able to read all tags at all frequencies
in the UHF range, and possibly in the HF range too. At the time, RFID readers
were relatively expensive—several thousand dollars—and we were convinced that
the electronics in a reader cost only a couple of hundred dollars. We commissioned
yet another startup, Thing Magic, to develop an open-sourced reader, which we
placed on our public website. This too was an eye-opener to end users who had
been conditioned to pay high prices for readers.
Going Global
Since by definition our vision was global, we decided to make our enterprise glob-
al. The Auto-ID Center was located at MIT, so what would “global” actually mean?
Our answer lay in reaching out to university partners around the world. We first
reached out to our old friends in the other Cambridge, at Cambridge University in
the UK. Professor Duncan MacFarlane joined the center in 2000 and founded an
Auto-ID Center in Cambridge, UK. The focus of this center was manufacturing.
We next reached out to continental Europe. Professor Elgar Fleisch of ETH Zurich
founded a Swiss center that had locations in Zurich and at the University of St.
Gallen. A number of European companies, both suppliers such as Unilever and
Nestle and retailers such as Tesco and Metro, also joined the center. The European
research presence gave us three advantages: excellent research talent, local credi-
bility, and a deep understanding of local issues such as privacy, which I address
later.
After Europe, we turned our attention to Asia. We already had received a great
deal of interest from Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese manufacturers. Kevin made
a scouting trip to Japan and met Professor Jun Murai of Keio University, an icon in
the Japanese academic world who had played a major part in bringing the Internet
to Japan. Jun loved our vision and agreed to join the center. He gave us instant
credibility and reach in Japan. In the end, we had over 10 Japanese sponsors.
We encountered a problem with UHF frequency band availability in several
major countries, including in the EU region, India, and Japan. In some ways, RFID
bands are like highways, and the wider the highway, the more traffic—or read rates
—you can squeeze through. Through our collective lobbying, we were able to open
up bands in each region that was generous enough to permit good performance of
our standards.  The regional Auto-ID Centers played a critical part in this effort.
For example, Jun Murai played a key role in persuading the Japanese government
to open up a UHF band in the 950 MHz band.5 Our vision of a single universal
reader paid off: the Japanese band was accessible to our readers, and many com-
mercial vendors were able to build readers and tags that could operate at all the
UHF frequencies around the world.
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SOFTWARE
By definition, RFID data is real time and requires real-time action and reaction.
However, the natural tendency of IT professionals was to think of RFID as a bar-
code replacement, and they initially thought RFID readers could simply be
plugged into existing barcode software. We made a significant effort to persuade
companies that this would not work. Large software vendors, whose existing rela-
tionships with big corporations were threatened by this paradigm change, were our
biggest challenge.
There are several subtle ways in which RFID and barcodes are different. First,
unlike barcode readers, RFID readers read data all the time. Much of the data col-
lected from an RFID scanner is repetitive and must be discarded. When meaning-
ful reads do occur, they must be recognized and inferences must be made. This
processing must occur all the time in the background.
Second, RFID data merely indicates an item’s proximity to a reader. For exam-
ple, consider Figure 2, which shows two readers, one at the left entrance of a stor-
age area and one at the right entrance. Enterprise software needs to know if the
tagged object is in the room, but RFID merely indicates that a reader read the tag.
To be sure that the tagged object is in the room, the object must have passed
through only one of the readers. This type of logic is specific to layout and imple-
mentation. 
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Figure 2. Storage Area with Readers at Left and Right Gates
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Third, RFID data is a feedback mechanism, which means that it reports what
is happening on the ground, whereas existing enterprise software was largely one
way. Operators were given instructions and they were expected to follow them—
the real world wasn’t expected to “talk back.” For example, say that a pallet is being
loaded with packages coming off a conveyor. With RFID, the real world might
report back and say that the wrong package had been loaded and shrink-wrapped
onto the pallet, whereas enterprise software was largely incapable of accommodat-
ing this kind of feedback.
These issues were a sticking point with potential users of our new system in the
early 2000s. IT vendors have a strong hold over companies that depend on their
products for day-to-day operations, and IT innovations are becoming difficult to
implement without first convincing these gatekeepers—the large vendors. Today,
an implementation of SAP or Oracle or IBM is supposed to automate a company’s
business processes. However, software implementations can be expensive and sur-
prisingly inflexible. Changing business processes can be difficult and expensive.
We ran into this problem with RFID. However, new cloud software models, rapid
software development methodologies, and mobile phones are enabling a newer,
nimbler approach to software development. Not only are these approaches often
better and cheaper for companies, they also accelerate other innovations that are
today held back by monolithic software implementations.
Sun Microsystems was one of the first companies to become a sponsor of the
Auto-ID Center. As head of a company that thrived on data, the vision was imme-
diately clear to CEO Scott McNealy. With Sun backing us, startup companies again
proved to be our allies. Several startup companies, such as ConnecTerra, Globe
Ranger, and OATSystems, also joined the center. My initial vision for the software
architecture consisted of a series of software routers that processed RFID data in
flow mode rather than in batch mode. I also wanted to make the software open
source. OATSystems implemented its open-source software on contract, and we
released it to the community.6 However, in the end, companies preferred a differ-
ent approach: open interface standards and proprietary software. Nevertheless, our
functional vision became dominant. RFID “middleware” was born and became a
new category in the software world.
STANDARDS
By about 2002, the Auto-ID Center had gathered over 70 sponsors into a research
consortium that involved five universities and over one hundred participating
engineers and executives. We launched a field trial to test the concept of RFID in
the supply chain. We tagged pallets from distribution centers belonging to Johnson
& Johnson, Kraft, P&G, and Gillette, and tracked them to Walmart and Sam’s Club
DC’s in Tulsa, Oklahoma. The field test provided a vivid demonstration of what
was possible with RFID. Momentum was building, and the demand for commer-
cialization—as distinct from our experimental phase—was around the corner.
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Meanwhile, questions began to arise about the standards process. For example,
were the Auto-ID labs, a loose affiliation of university researchers and company
engineers, a standards governing body? In order to answer such questions, I
researched the way the World Wide Consortium and Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers promulgate standards, and then created a similarly demo-
cratic standards-development body within our research community. The first
committee I created was the Hardware Action Group (HAG), which would work
on the EPC and RFID protocols. Loek d’Hont of Matrix and Chris Diorio of yet
another startup, Impinj, joined the other key players in the HAG. I also created a
committee called the Software Action Group (SAG), which would work on soft-
ware interfaces. Ken Traub, the chief technology officer of ConnecTerra, led the
SAG along with another MIT alum, Bruce Delagi of Sun Microsystems. Ken would
play a major role in the subsequent development of standards in the EPC world
and would be a coauthor of virtually every major standards document now used in
the field.
Creating the HAG and SAG was a milestone because it formalized the stan-
dards formation process for RFID hardware and software. We also created an IP
policy so that participants in the standard-setting process would have clear expec-
tations of how their contributions would be protected. This also laid the ground-
work for the commercialization of EPC.
By the end of 2002, companies were asking us to issue them EPC numbers. We
did, but we did not have a mechanism to charge them a fee. Kevin and I started
brainstorming about spinning off a not-for-profit entity. The bodies around the
world that issued barcodes had recently coordinated their efforts and formed a
loose worldwide standards body called GS1. GS1 US, formerly the Uniform Code
Council, had been a sponsor of the Auto-ID Center. However, there was some ten-
sion between the EPC and GS1 communities, perhaps based on the fear that RFID
would replace barcodes. Kevin and I, meanwhile, feared that GS1 was an old-fash-
ioned organization without the expertise to manage this new enfant terrible, the
EPC. The ice was broken when the leadership of GS1 changed. In June 2002, the
new CEO of GS1 sent his chief technology officer, Bernie Hogan, to discuss the
possibility of transferring the commercialization of the EPC to GS1. After a num-
ber of discussions in which Kevin and I insisted that EPC be handled differently,
GS1 agreed to form a new organization called EPCglobal as a subsidiary of GS1. I
met with MIT’s dean of engineering, Tom Magnanti, and head of the Technology
Licensing Office, Lita Nelsen, to propose that we give our intellectual property
rights away to EPCglobal for nominal licensing fees. I was pleasantly surprised by
their positive reaction. Tom’s words were, “If it’s good for the world, we will give it
away.” EPCglobal was formed in early 2003, and the transfer occurred in the sum-
mer of 2003. 
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TECHNOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY
Since the early days of developing RFID, MIT researcher Dan Engels and I had
been writing academic papers on the technical problems that would become
important in RFID in the years ahead. For example, we wrote a series of papers on
interference between readers—a problem that was eventually tackled in a later ver-
sion of the EPC air protocol.7 One problem we addressed early on was privacy.
Because RFID tags can be read without line of sight, it is conceivable that someone
could read the contents of another person’s shopping bag. Dan and I and two col-
leagues wrote a series of papers on this topic in 2002 and 2003.8 Meanwhile, Kevin
Ashton formed an advisory group to consider public policy issues. Elliot Maxwell,
who is now a Fellow of the Communications Program at Johns Hopkins University,
chaired the group, which gave us wise counsel on protecting privacy—guidance
that has made it into every EPC tag since, including the ability to kill a tag.
This did not stop a storm of controversy from erupting, driven in part by a
misunderstanding of the technology. For example, some articles indicated that
RFID tags used indoors could be read from the street. Kevin, Dick Cantwell, and I
spent hundreds of hours fielding calls on the topic, writing articles, and doing
interviews. In later years, I would testify before U.S. congressional committees and
to various privacy czars in Europe. While I don’t think such concerns derailed
committed EPC users, in the end they did deter companies that were on the fence.
In many ways, EPC became a lightning rod for privacy fears about technology in
general—GPS, mobile phones, loyalty cards, and so on. While emotions were run-
ning high at the time and fears were overstated, I believe the tension of the contro-
versy raised the game of the technology community. Ten years on, the upcoming
version of the EPC standard has very advanced methods for hiding the identity of
tags. 
COMMERCIALIZATION AND EPCGLOBAL
Two major events occurred in 2003 that shook the RFID world. First, Gillette
ordered 500 million EPC tags from Alien Technology. This was, as far I can tell, the
largest single order in the history of RFID, and any lingering doubts about the via-
bility of the upstart new system were put to rest. Second, Walmart announced a
compliance mandate that would require its top suppliers to tag products that they
shipped to its facilities. Given Walmart’s heft in the retail world, this was a major
move in the industry. The drums of commercialization were beating fast.
The Auto-ID Center had its last meeting in the summer of 2003 in Zurich. It
was a bittersweet moment, as many of us had been close collaborators and had
become friends. I was very keen, though, that the center be closed, as its work was
done and the commercial phase of our operation needed to begin through
EPCglobal.9
From 2004 onward, other retailers started announcing tagging requirements,
and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) also announced an EPC tagging effort.
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Over a dozen startup companies were launched, and existing companies raised
more than $300 million in venture capital. The industry was abuzz with news and
excitement, and the EPC movement made it into the New York Times and Time
magazine. Little did we know that this was the beginning of another seesaw battle.
EARLY EPCGLOBAL
Two immediate priorities faced EPCglobal in its infancy. The first was the devel-
opment of a standard for the next EPC version. The other was dealing with intel-
lectual property on a commercial scale. 
I am a believer in Schumpeter’s views of creative destruction. The first versions
of the EPC protocols, the EPC Gen 1 protocols, worked well, but few designers get
it exactly right the first time so, much to the chagrin of many of the vendors who
were developing healthy expectations for the Gen 1 protocols, I commissioned the
development of a Gen 2 protocol. I felt that we had left out some important fea-
tures from Gen 1, and that the new protocol could be better and faster. This was
my last executive action before the formation of EPCglobal. I persuaded Chris
Diorio of Impinj to lead the development of Gen 2. In the years ahead, he and
Stephen Smith of Alien would combine innovations and create a masterful new
protocol that has become a staple in the RFID world today: Gen 2. In the run up
to this, Dan Engels and I wrote papers summarizing the different classes of proto-
cols and describing how mixed populations of tags—Gen 1 and Gen 2—could be
read by the same reader.10 In this manner we assured end users that they could
make the transition to Gen 2 without worrying about their inventories being con-
taminated with Gen 1 populations. Gen 2 had several new features, including an
improved ability to deal with reader interference, better control over tags, and bet-
ter reading performance.
The second major initiative EPCglobal had to undertake was clearing the field
for intellectual property. While we had added certain IP safeguards in 2001, the
issues that came up during commercialization had become much more complex.
The Auto-ID Center itself had over one hundred sponsors by then, including sev-
eral large companies. Each had its own IP portfolio, and a great deal of jockeying
ensued. The issues ranged from offense to defense. If a company had IP from
which it thought it could make a fraction of a cent per EPC tag, it wanted to pro-
tect it. If, on the other hand, it felt its own IP was compromised, it considered itself
at risk. In the end, while we thought our protocol did not violate any of the IP, some
companies felt they had IP on device and manufacturing tricks that would be
needed to implement the actual chip. In the end we managed to thread the needle,
and the protocol itself was considered to be free of external IP encumberment.
This was a major milestone in the commercialization of the EPC. Eventually we
would take the EPC and other related standards to the International Standards
Organization with success: a version of the original Gen 2 standard is now an ISO
standard.11
innovations / volume 7, number 3 47
48 innovations / Making in America
THE LONG ROAD TO COMMERCIAL SUCCESS
By 2005, it became clear that there were other twists and turns ahead in the EPC
journey. In retrospect, there were three reasons for the length and tortuousness of
the journey:
1. Changing business processes is difficult. The first industry that the EPC indus-
try targeted was retail. Other industries, such as aerospace and defense, have since
adopted EPC, but retail remains a mainstay. Retail, however, also would prove the
most challenging, primarily due to the dynamics of the industry. First, the retail
industry is based on mass-scale business processes. Walmart, for example, has
more than four thousand stores worldwide. To install readers in all these stores and
to get all the store associates to change their business practices is a massive chal-
lenge. That Walmart has achieved this 10 years after its first use of RFID is a testa-
ment to their perseverance. Second, the mandate approach created tension
between retailers and suppliers. Suppliers felt they were being burdened with the
cost of the tags while the retailers reaped all the benefits. RFID got caught up in
these negotiations.
2. There are hidden costs in technology implementation. While the Auto-ID
Center and EPCglobal had successfully shown how to reduce the cost of readers
and tags, other costs would add up when the business cases for RFID were drawn.
For example, reader installation costs—power, Ethernet, etc.—would in many
cases exceed the cost of the readers. Perhaps even more painful were IT integration
costs. IT architecture in many companies are layer upon layer of legacy implemen-
tation going back several decades. It is hard to take a new real-time information
source and integrate it with a complex, often antiquated stack of software.
3. It is easier to sell a painkiller than a vitamin. Or so the old business maxim
goes, and we discovered the truth of it the hard way. While the business case for
RFID was positive, retailers and suppliers were satisfied with their businesses in
the mid 2000s. Business was strong, and there was no real reason to invest in
change. At that point, regular retail’s greatest threat was from online retail. RFID
was attractive, but it was third or fourth on businesses’ priority list. The 2008 crash
spelled doom for any new technology initiative, at least temporarily, as businesses
were suddenly cash strapped and discretionary spending plummeted. A number of
RFID startup companies went out of business or were sold for assets in that peri-
od.
The 2008 crash, strangely, also provided precisely the pain that was needed to
trigger renewed interest in RFID. Figure 3 shows the ratio of inventories to sales
for U.S. manufacturing and trade industries.12 Following the crash, companies with
high inventories were doubly penalized; not only were sales down, but now they
had inventory they could not get rid off. Many retailers—and many businesses in
general—went through a very tough period. The lesson had been learned. It can be
seen in the figure that inventories have been lower in subsequent years.
The apparel retail industry was particularly hard hit, and it is now the industry
leading a massive move to RFID. Walmart, Macy’s, JCPenney, Inditex, Gerry
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Weber, and many other retailers have announced plans to tag much if not all of
their apparel. The EPC industry is now in a major upswing, and investments in
EPC technologies are once again increasing. The last two years have been relative-
ly healthy for RFID, and 14 years after the launch of our research, EPC is now truly
a sustaining industry. 
CURRENT STATE OF THE EPC INDUSTRY
Over the years there has been a lot of consolidation in the EPC industry. Matrix
was acquired by Symbol (now Motorola), ConnecTerra was acquired by BEA
Systems, Vue Technology was acquired by Tyco, and OATSystems was acquired by
Checkpoint Systems. Impinj has filed for a public offering. Over 2.5 billion RFID
tags will be sold in 2012, and the number is projected to increase significantly in
the years ahead. EPC is certainly at the top of the list for technologies to consider
in retail.
The apparel industry is currently the most exciting sector for EPC tags. The
fundamental problem in apparel is the difficulty of counting inventory. For exam-
ple, all the items in a stack of jeans look the same to a store associate, but they are
of many different sizes. If a customer can’t find her size, a sale is lost. The process
of monitoring apparel inventory is cumbersome, and retailers consistently dump
end-of-season inventory to secondary resellers and liquidators, a very inefficient
practice. Having EPC tags on clothing enables store associates to assess inventory
rapidly. Handheld readers have proven to be an effective technology for this pur-
pose. Handheld performance has improved significantly in recent years because of
improvements in battery life and read range. Handheld readers are also relatively
easy to deploy, as they communicate wirelessly and thus do not require power
lines.
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Figure 3. The 2008 crash starkly illustrated the risks of carrying too much
inventory.
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LESSONS LEARNED
We learned many lesson during this journey, and I summarize them here.
Systems Technology Is Different 
Universities and research institutions commercialize thousands of innovations
every year, primarily component technologies. Electronic Product Code is a sys-
tems innovation, and there have been fewer attempts to commercialize systems
technologies. Systems consist of not one or two but several components and stan-
dards and they require a user community to reach the point of self-sustainability
and value. The Internet and the World Wide Web are two notable examples. 
“Big Idea” Systems Development Is Critical but Losing Its Cachet 
Systems require long periods of incubation before they can be commercialized.
The Internet benefited from years of support from the DoD’s Advanced Research
Projects Agency (ARPA, later DARPA.) The World Wide Web was invented and
developed at CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, and then
incubated at MIT with the formation of the World Wide Web Consortium in 1994.
Again, DARPA was a sponsor. The EPC may not yet have achieved the same scale,
but it was founded as a more industry-oriented partnership. Its eventual success
was due in large part to the staying power of the community that built it—
researchers, engineers, business executives, and companies such as Walmart. For
me, Kevin, and David Brock, the venture carried career-ending risks. I did not have
tenure when I founded the center, although I was fortunate to receive it in 2003.
The Auto-ID Center did receive $300,000 of funding from the DoD, but it did
not receive funding from other federal agencies, such as the National Science
Foundation. In fact, I believe funding agencies in the U.S. are gradually losing their
ability and willingness to sponsor the type of game-changing systems efforts the
nation has thrived on. I worry that there are few “big idea” projects on the radar
today. The difficulty may lie in the silos in funding agencies, which are essentially
built around component areas rather than systems. DARPA has been effective in
funding big systems, but its defense-oriented mandate limits its applicability in
general areas. Still, DARPA, was and remains our one big government supporter.
Systems Are Cross-Cutting
Component technologies fit neatly into traditional engineering departments, but
systems know no boundaries. Our project spanned several areas: mechanical engi-
neering (my home department), electrical engineering, computer science, engi-
neering systems, management, marketing, operations, law, and political science. I
was lucky to be at MIT, which has an open culture, but crossing territorial bound-
aries generally is difficult. Furthermore, it is said of systems that “the sum is greater
than the parts,” which has key implications academically. Writing papers on indi-
vidual topics was a challenge early in the process, because conferences and jour-
nals in any area would only see a small facet of the larger puzzle being addressed
Sanjay Sarma 
How Inexpensive RFID Is Revolutionizing the Supply Chain
and often consider the contribution it made trivial. Therefore, the natural tenden-
cy of an author is to over intellectualize a solution to gain acceptance. This works
against systems thinking, where Occam’s razor is important—the simplest solu-
tion, which may not be worthy of an academic paper, is often the best solution.
Successful system designs abhor unnecessary complications, but I have observed
that real-world problems eventually do lead to deep intellectual challenges that
merit high-quality scholarship. RFID security, for example has become a vibrant
field, and our first paper on the topic now has over one thousand citations.
However, the compartmentalized nature of academic publishing, and academic
publish-or-perish timelines, are not conducive to thoughtful system design.
Systems Require an Ecosystem
Despite the challenges described above, academe is the ideal place to build and
implement ground-breaking systems technologies. Other large systems such as
GSM standards for mobile phones and Wi-Fi for wireless networking, which are
primarily standards efforts, have been developed entirely in industry consortia
with little academic involvement. However, the primary task in these efforts was
standards development; the capability of technology was never in question. When
it comes to leaps forward in technology, universities offer ideal, neutral platforms
for putting together the ecosystem required for a system to be developed. There
clearly are ways universities and funding agencies can further facilitate the process,
but there are no other venues for big-idea projects and cross-cutting research. The
ecosystem is critical in launching these systems. Hardware, software, businesses,
regulations, and standards do need to come together to enable the system, and field
trials, industry roadmaps, and cooperative commitments from companies are nec-
essary for the system to become self-sustaining. 
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